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Advances in information technology have improved the administrative feasibility of 
redistribution based on lifetime earnings recorded at the time of retirement. We study optimal 
lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy in which redistributive taxation 
and social insurance serve to insure (ex ante) against skill heterogeneity as well as disability 
risk. Optimal disability benefits rise with previous earnings so that public transfers depend not 
only on current earnings but also on earnings in the past. Hence, lifetime taxation rather than 
annual taxation is optimal. The optimal tax-transfer system does not provide full disability 
insurance. By offering imperfect insurance and structuring disability benefits so as to enable 
workers to insure against disability by working harder, social insurance is designed to offset 
the distortionary impact of the redistributive labor income tax on labor supply. 
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1. Introduction
Much of the inequality in the distribution of annual incomes stems from people having
diﬀerent earnings capacities in various stages of the life cycle. Hence, in the presence of
well-functioning capital markets enabling consumers to smooth consumption over the life
cycle, redistributive taxes and transfers should address inequalities in the distribution
of lifetime incomes. Yet, in practice, taxes and transfers are mostly conditioned on
annual income, with little or no regard to a person’s longer-run earnings capacity. The
explanation is mainly administrative because governments rarely keep systematic records
of the earnings histories of their citizens. Moreover, since a person’s lifetime labor earnings
are not fully known until the time he or she retires, the authorities cannot base taxes
and transfers on lifetime income. However, it is possible to condition public retirement
beneﬁt so nap e r s o n ’ sp r e v i o u se a r n i n g s . T h ee ﬀective marginal and average tax rate
on income earned earlier in life thus becomes dependent on earnings in other periods
of life. In fact, retirement beneﬁts in many countries do to some extent depend on
previous earnings. Moreover, with modern information and communication technologies,
information on individual earnings histories becomes much easier to gather and store. The
question whether an optimal tax-transfer system should exploit information on lifetime
earnings therefore becomes relevant.
This paper addresses this issue. In particular, we study whether social insurance
beneﬁts aimed at compensating for a loss of earnings capacity should depend on previ-
ous labor income. Although for the sake of concreteness we label the shock to earnings
capacity as disability, our analysis applies also to other types of idiosyncratic shocks to
human capital. In our model, people participate in the labor market for two periods, but
some people become disabled in the second period. The government wants to redistribute
income for two reasons: ﬁrst, to reduce inequalities stemming from exogenous diﬀerences
2in productivities at the beginning of the working life and, second, to compensate un-
lucky individuals who become disabled during their career. In the late stage of life, able
individuals receive an ordinary retirement beneﬁt, while the disabled collect a special
disability beneﬁt. Both types of beneﬁts may be conditioned on previous earnings.
We show that the optimal disability beneﬁt should increase more strongly with previ-
ous income than the ordinary retirement beneﬁt. In this way, the government can provide
disability insurance to not only the low-skilled but also to the high-skilled, while at the
same time improving the ﬁrst-period labor-supply incentives of the high-skilled. By thus
basing second-period transfers on ﬁrst-period earnings, the optimal tax-transfer system
involves lifetime taxation rather than annual taxation. In the presence of distortionary
labor taxes aimed at redistribution from the high-skilled to the low-skilled, optimal dis-
ability insurance is only imperfect. The reason is that imperfect disability insurance
encourages young workers to increase their ﬁrst-period earnings by working harder. By
raising their labor supply, workers can improve their insurance against disability because
the disability beneﬁt increases more strongly with previous income than the ordinary
retirement beneﬁt collected by able workers. Our analysis thus shows that full disability
insurance is not optimal. Thus, even though the private market could implement full
disability insurance (since moral hazard is absent in our model), this would not be op-
timal because private insurers would fail to internalize the external eﬀects of additional
disability insurance on the base of the redistributive labor tax. The government thus
faces an incentive to prevent private insurance companies from fully insuring disability.
Indeed, a mix of a public tax-transfer system oﬀering less than full insurance and self
insurance through precautionary saving is optimal.
The optimal tax literature has considered linear as well as non-linear tax systems.
Real-world tax systems are typically piece-wise linear. In fact, recent decades have wit-
nessed a trend towards more linearity, as governments have ﬂattened their tax schedules
and reduced the number of income brackets to simplify the tax system. Against this
background, we consider a linear tax-transfer system with a constant marginal tax rate.
However, by tying social insurance beneﬁts to previous earnings, the policy maker in
our model can diﬀerentiate the eﬀective marginal tax rate on labor income according
to lifetime earnings capacity. Our analysis shows that it is indeed optimal to exploit
3opportunities for such diﬀerentiation.
The literature on lifetime income taxation is quite sparse. Vickrey (1939, 1947) made
early contributions to the normative theory of lifetime income taxation. He was concerned
about the overtaxation of ﬂuctuating as opposed to stable incomes under a progressive
annual income tax with a marginal tax rate that rises with the level of income. Vickrey
therefore proposed an income-averaging scheme in which annual income taxes are in fact
collected as a form of withholding for lifetime income tax calculations that are completed
only upon death.
Diamond (2003, ch. 3 and 4) analyzes lifetime income taxation in a two-period setting,
but without allowing for early retirement due to disability. He ﬁnds that the optimal non-
linear lifetime income tax tends to imply greater equality of consumption levels among
retirees than among workers, assuming that the elderly tend to be more risk averse
than younger people. Intuitively, when the marginal utility of consumption declines
faster for the elderly, the social planner is more eager to avoid inequality of consumption
opportunities among the elderly than among younger people.
A paper more closely related to the present one is that of Diamond and Mirrlees
(1978), who analyze optimal social insurance in a two-period model in which agents can
choose their retirement age endogenously, but may also be forced to retire early due to
an exogenous risk of disability. One of the results derived by Diamond and Mirrlees is
that agents who suﬀer disability early in life should receive a larger net transfer from
the government than those able to work until later in life. The optimal social insurance
scheme subsidizes those who retire early, although only to the extent compatible with
maintaining incentives to work. This result is consistent with the analysis in the present
paper. In some respects, the model of Diamond and Mirrlees (op.cit.) is more general
than the one presented here, since they allow for a fully non-linear tax scheme (including
a capital income tax). However, whereas Diamond and Mirrlees assume that all able
workers feature the same productivity, we allow for diﬀerent skill levels. In our model,
the government thus employs its redistributive policy instruments to ’insure’ against
not only skill heterogeneity but also disability risk. We thus integrate the conventional
analysis of optimal redistributive taxation with the analysis of optimal social insurance.
Moreover, by employing Epstein-Zin preferences (see Epstein and Zin (1989)), we are
4able to provide a detailed characterization of the optimal tax and subsidy rates.
Recent contributions to the literature on social insurance based on mandatory indi-
vidual savings accounts also consider redistribution policy in a lifetime perspective (see,
e.g., Fölster (1997, 1999), Orszag and Snower (1997), Feldstein and Altman (1998), Föl-
ster et al. (2002), Stiglitz and Yun (2002), Sørensen (2003) and Bovenberg and Sørensen
(2004)). These papers analyze policy schemes in which workers must contribute a fraction
of their earnings to an individual savings account that is debited when the owner draws
certain social insurance beneﬁts. At the time of retirement, any surplus on the account
is converted into an annuity and added to the ordinary public retirement beneﬁt. If the
account is negative, the owner is still guaranteed a minimum public pension. Bovenberg
and Sørensen (op.cit.) show that the introduction of such a system as a supplement to
the conventional tax-transfer system improves the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ by reducing
the distortionary impact of those taxes and transfers that mainly serve to redistribute
income over the individual’s own lifecycle.
Mandatory individual savings accounts for social insurance introduce an element of
lifetime income taxation by eﬀectively conditioning retirement beneﬁts on the individual’s
prior labor market performance. Intertemporally optimizing agents who are able to
accumulate a surplus on their account at the time of retirement face reduced marginal
tax rates on labor eﬀort. Individuals who end up with a surplus on their accounts —
and who will therefore face stronger incentives to supply labor — tend to be concentrated
in the low-risk segments of the working population. This is in contrast to the optimal
tax-transfer system in the economy modelled here, where people who end up with a
relatively low lifetime income due to disability actually face a lower marginal eﬀective tax
rate on labor income earned early in life. The contradiction is only superﬁcial, however.
The system of mandatory savings accounts is designed for social insurance beneﬁts that
involve a signiﬁcant risk of moral hazard and relatively little redistribution from high to
low lifetime incomes (as opposed to redistribution over the lifecycle). The present paper,
however, focuses on optimal redistribution of lifetime incomes in a setting with exogenous
idiosyncratic shocks to human capital. In any case, the individual accounts considered
by Bovenberg and Sørensen (2004) and the social insurance scheme analyzed here are
based on the same fundamental principle: net beneﬁts received at a later stage in life
5vary positively with labor income earned earlier in life so as to reduce the distortions to
labor supply caused by a redistributive tax-transfer system.
2. The model
Individuals live for two periods. Everybody is able to work in the ﬁrst period, but in
the second period individuals face the risk of becoming disabled. Disabled individuals
must ﬁnance their consumption by saving undertaken in the ﬁrst period and by a public
transfer that may be conditioned on their previous earnings. Able individuals work during
(part of) the second period. The leisure consumed by able workers in period 2 may be
interpreted as time voluntarily spent in retirement. Larger second-period labor supply
can thus be viewed as a higher retirement age. The government transfer collected by able
workers in the second period corresponds to an ordinary retirement beneﬁt. Also this
beneﬁt may be conditioned on previous earnings, and it may be diﬀerentiated from the
disability beneﬁt. We distinguish two skill groups (the low-skilled and the high-skilled)
earning diﬀerent real wage rates reﬂecting exogenous diﬀerences in labor productivity.
Also the real interest rate is exogenous. Indeed, our economy can be viewed as a small
open economy with perfect capital mobility.
2.1. Individual behavior
This section describes the behavior of a low-skilled worker; the behavior of the high-
skilled is given by fully analogous relationships. A low-skilled worker’s labor supply in
the ﬁrst period is  1, and his consumption during that period is C1 .I fh ei sa b l et ow o r k
in the second period, he supplies labor  2 and consumes an amount Ca
2 .I fh eb e c o m e s
disabled in period 2, his consumption is Cd
2 . His expected lifetime utility U is given by
the nested utility function




















6where U1 (·) denotes utility during the ﬁrst period of life, δ ad i s c o u n tf a c t o r ,E [U2]
expected utility during the second period, and p the probability of becoming disabled
in the second period. Utility during the ﬁrst period depends on ﬁrst-period consump-
tion, adjusted for the disutility of ﬁrst-period work eﬀort, g( 1). Similarly, for an able
worker, the second-period utility u(Ca
2 − h( 2)) depends on his consumption corrected






. The speciﬁcation in (2.1) is suﬃciently ﬂexible to allow the degree of in-
tertemporal substitutability in consumption to deviate from the reciprocal of the degree
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2  − h( 2)). (2.6)
In the special case in which the reciprocal of the intertemporal substitution elasticity
coincides with the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion, f00 =0so that the (ex ante) mar-
ginal utility of disabled consumption does not depend on able consumption (i.e. U00
da  =0 ) .
f00 is positive (negative) if the degree of risk aversion is greater (smaller) than the in-
verse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity so that the marginal utility of disabled
consumption rises (falls) with able consumption.
During the ﬁrst period, the consumer’s budget constraint amounts to
C1  = w(1 − t) 1 + G − S
 , (2.7)
where w represents the real wage rate of a low-skilled worker, t the constant marginal tax
rate on labor income, G a lump-sum transfer, and S  saving of the low-skilled worker. In
the second period, an able worker receives a beneﬁt consisting of a lump-sum component
B plus a component amounting to a fraction sa of his earnings during the ﬁrst period.




2  =( 1+r)S
  + w(1 − t) 2 + B + s
aw 1. (2.8)
A disabled worker receives a beneﬁt equal to the constant b plus a fraction sd of his
previous labor income, so his second-period budget constraint is:
C
d
2  =( 1+r)S
  + b + s
dw 1. (2.9)
The consumer maximizes (2.1) subject to (2.7) through (2.9). Optimal second-period
labor supply implies that the marginal disutility of work equals the marginal after-tax
real wage:
h
0 ( 2)=w(1 − t). (2.10)











1  =0 , (2.11)
where U
0
1  represents the marginal utility of ﬁrst-period consumption of the low-skilled
worker. U
0
d  and U
0
a  are deﬁned in (2.2) and (2.3), respectively.
The ﬁrst-order condition for optimal ﬁrst-period labor supply amounts to
[w(1 − t) − g
0( 1)]U
0











Part of the beneﬁto fﬁrst-period labor supply accrues in the second period if disability
and retirement beneﬁts rise with earnings (i.e. sa,s d > 0). S u b s t i t u t i n g( 2 . 1 1 )i n t o( 2 . 1 2 )
to eliminate U
0
1 , we can write (2.12) as
w(1 − ˆ t1 )=g
0( 1), (2.13)
where
ˆ t1  = t −
µ
















The variable ˆ p  can be viewed as the risk-neutral probability of becoming disabled
for the low-skilled worker, so that ˆ t1  may be interpreted as a risk-adjusted (certainty-
equivalent) marginal eﬀective tax rate on ﬁrst-period labor income for the low-skilled
8worker. The risk-neutral probabilities diﬀer from real-world probabilities if agents are
risk-averse and not perfectly insured (so that U
0
d  6= U
0





a , the individual can enhance the insurance against disability risk by raising ﬁrst-






then diﬀers from the corresponding eﬀective marginal tax rate





.B yd i ﬀerentiating sd from sa, the government thus makes
the marginal tax rate on ﬁrst-period income depend on second-period income. In other
words, marginal and average tax rates depend on lifetime earnings. A key issue addressed
in this paper is whether such lifetime income taxation
¡
sd 6= sa¢
is in fact optimal and if
so, which factors determine the optimal gap between sd and sa.
For welfare analysis, we employ the consumer’s indirect lifetime utility function, which
exhibits the form
V
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Setting aside issues of intergenerational redistribution, we assume that the present value
of the taxes levied on each generation equals the present value of transfers paid to that
generation. This implies that the generational account of each cohort is zero. The high-
skilled are paid the wage rate W>w , and a high-skilled worker’s labor supply is denoted
by L. The exogenous fraction of low-skilled individuals in each cohort is α.B o t h s k i l l
types face the same probability p of disability in the second period of life. Normalizing
the size of the cohort to unity, and using subscripts to indicate time periods, we can write
the constraint that a cohort’s generational account must be zero as
α
generational account of a low-skilled worker



















generational account of a high-skilled worker



















Assuming that disability cannot be veriﬁed, the government also faces the incentive
compatibility constraint that an able worker should have no incentive to mimic a disabled
worker. In other words, the second-period utility of a mimicker should be no higher than
the second-period utility of a non-mimicker.1 For low-skilled workers, the resulting non-




  + w 2 (1 − t)+B + s















w 1 ≥ 0, (2.20)
and for high-skilled workers the analogous constraint amounts to
Z





WL1 ≥ 0. (2.21)
The government maximizes the utilitarian sum of expected lifetime utilities. With V  
and V h indicating the utility of a low-skilled and that of a high-skilled worker, respectively,












which must be maximized with respect to the policy instruments G,b,B,t,sd,s a,s u b j e c t
to the constraints (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21).
3. Optimal taxation and social insurance
3.1. The optimality of social insurance through lifetime income taxation
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the solution to the policy problem stated in the previous
section are given in section A.3 of the appendix. Before exploring the implications of these
optimality conditions, we demonstrate that a lifetime income tax, rather than an annual
income tax, is optimal. In particular, the government can generate a Pareto improvement
1Sub-section 3.4 shows that the non-mimicking constraint is typically met in the optimum.
10by moving from a conventional tax-transfer system based on annual incomes only (i.e.
sd = sa) towards lifetime income taxation with sd >s a. Indeed, with sd >s a, the ex-
post eﬀective marginal tax rate on ﬁrst-period labor income depends on lifetime earnings
capacity. Moreover, second-period transfers are based not only on the earnings in that
period, but also on the earnings in the ﬁrst period. Hence, the government implements
lifetime income taxation.
To prove these results, we start out from a situation with annual income taxation
(s = sd = sa), where the government has optimized the other policy instruments in a
manner respecting the non-mimicking constraints (2.20) and (2.21). With annual income
taxation, it is optimal to increase b and to reduce B in a balanced-budget manner such
that the non-mimicking constraint for the low-skilled worker becomes binding. The reason
is that enhancing disability insurance in this way does not aﬀect labor-supply incentives
if sa = sd (since (A.12) and (A.13) in the appendix imply that labor supply does not
respond to b and B with annual income taxation). In the absence of a trade-oﬀ between
incentives and insurance, full disability insurance for the low-skilled is optimal. With
sd = sa, only the low-skilled can be fully insured against disability (i.e. Z  ≥ 0 implies
Zh > 0 (and hence U0
dh − U0
ah > 0), since WL2 (1 − t) − h(L2) >w   2 (1 − t) − h( 2)).2
Intuitively, compared to the low-skilled, the high-skilled lose more earnings in case of
disability, but receive the same compensation b − B if sd = sa.
Starting from an equilibrium with annual taxation, we consider a policy experiment
involving an increase in sd and a decrease in sa calibrated so as to keep the average
subsidy rate e s ≡ psd +( 1− p)sa constant, that is, a policy change satisfying








d > 0. (3.1)
At the same time, the government adjusts the policy instrument b to satisfy the binding
non-mimicking constraint (2.20). Recalling that sd = sa initially, and using (3.1) to
eliminate dsa, this requires












Finally, G is adjusted to keep the utility of the low-skilled agents constant, given the
policy changes speciﬁed in (3.1) and (3.2). Using the expressions for V  
G and V  
b given in
2The Envelope Theorem implies that the surpluses WL2 (1 − t) − h(L2) and w 2 (1 − t) − h( 2) are
increasing in the pre-tax wage rate. W>wthus implies that WL2 (1 − t)−h(L2) >w   2 (1 − t)−h( 2).
11(2.17), and noting from (2.11) that full insurance implies that U0
d  = U0
a  = U0
1 /δ (1 + r),





Using (2.19), one can easily show that the policy changes described by (3.1) through
( 3 . 3 )h a v en od i r e c ti m p a c to nn e tg o v e r n m e n tr e v e n u es ot h a tt h er e v e n u ee ﬀect of the
policy reform depends only on labor supply responses. With a binding non-mimicking
constraint (2.20) (and thus full disability insurance of the low-skilled (i.e. U0
d  = U0
a )),
(2.14) implies that the changes in sd and sa satisfying (3.1) will not aﬀect the eﬀective
tax rate b t1  and hence will not aﬀect  1, according to (2.13). Furthermore, since t is
unchanged, it follows from (2.10) that also  2 and L2 are constant, while (A.12) and
(A.14) in the appendix imply that ∂L1
∂b = ∂L1
∂G =0when sd = sa. According to (A.6) and
(A.7) in the appendix, the changes in sd and sa will aﬀect the ﬁrst-period labor supply
























∂t < 0 is the compensated response of ﬁrst-period high-skilled labor supply to
a change in the ordinary tax rate t. Using (3.1), (2.11), and (2.15), and recalling that
U0
dh − U0

























d > 0. (3.5)
Thus, high-skilled labor supply expands. Intuitively, when disability insurance is linked
more closely to ﬁrst-period labor eﬀort, high-skilled workers can enhance their disability
insurance by working harder. The improved labor-supply incentives beneﬁtt h eg o v e r n -
ment budget as long as t1 = t − s
1+r > 0.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ec h a n g e si nb, G, sa, and sd increase the lifetime utility of
high-skilled workers, since it follows from (2.17), (2.18) and (3.1) through (3.3) that3
dV





d > 0. (3.6)
We conclude that moving from annual to lifetime taxation in this way enhances both
labor-market incentives and disability insurance for the high-skilled. Lifetime taxation
3We use the fact that the derivatives of the indirect utility function of the high-skilled are given by
expressions analogous to (2.17) and (2.18).
12thus improves the trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives. Even without redistributive
motives (i.e. t1 =0 ) , lifetime income taxation dominates annual taxation because of
the possibility to oﬀer better disability insurance for the high-skilled without violating
the non-mimicking constraint for the low-skilled. These arguments are strengthened if
redistributive taxation distorts labor supply. In that case, lifetime taxation not only
improves disability insurance, but also alleviates the labor-market distortions imposed
by redistributive taxation.
3.2. The suboptimality of full insurance
We now proceed to show that full disability insurance of both skill groups can never be
optimal, even though separate linear tax schedules for the high-skilled and the low-skilled
allow for full insurance. To prove this result, we show that starting from an equilibrium
with full insurance of both skill groups, we can design a policy reform that leaves the
utility levels of both groups unaﬀected, while at the same time raising public revenue.
We start by noting that if both skill groups are fully insured (so that the non-
mimicking constraints are both met with equality), we may add (2.20) and (2.21) to
obtain
(WL 2 − w 2)(1 − t) − [h(L2) − h( 2)] = (s
d − s
a)(WL1 − w 1). (3.7)
Since the left-hand side is positive (see footnote 2), and ﬁrst-period skilled earnings
exceed the corresponding unskilled earnings (i.e. WL1 >w   1), this expression implies
that sd >s a. Intuitively, compared to the low-skilled, high-skilled households face a larger
income loss if they become disabled. Hence, if low-skilled agents are fully insured against
disability risk, the disability beneﬁtm u s tr i s em o r ew i t he a r n i n g st h a nt h er e t i r e m e n t
beneﬁt does, so as to ensure that also the high-skilled agents are not hurt should they
become disabled.
We now make disability insurance less than perfect by reducing b and increasing G.
We reduce disability insurance in such a way that the lifetime utility of both households
remains constant. Using the expressions for V  
G and V  
b given in (2.17), along with the
analogous expressions for the high-skilled group, and noting from (2.11) that full insur-
ance (i.e., U0
d = U0
a)i m p l i e st h a tU0
d = U0
1/δ (1 + r) for both skill groups, we ﬁnd that
such a policy reform must satisfy expression (3.3). From the government’s perspective,
13the eﬀective marginal tax rate on ﬁr s t - p e r i o dl a b o ri n c o m ei s( s e e( 2 . 1 9 ) )
t1 ≡ t −
e s
1+r
, e s ≡ ps
d +( 1− p)s
a, (3.8)
where e s denotes the expected second-period subsidy rate on ﬁrst-period income. With
this deﬁnition of the ﬁrst-period marginal tax rate, the overall impact of the policy reform
on the government budget (2.19) can be written as t1w[αd 1 +( 1− α)dL1]. While (3.3)
ensures that the direct eﬀect on the budget is zero, (2.10) implies that second-period
labor supply remains constant because the tax rate t is unaﬀected. The government
budget thus improves if the ﬁrst-period labor supply of both skill types increases (under
the assumption t1 > 0; sub-section 3.3 below shows that t1 is indeed typically positive in
the optimum). Given the relationship between dG and db implied by (3.3), labor supply
















> 0 for s
d >s
a. (3.9)
The improvement of the public budget resulting from the utility-preserving policy
reform (3.3) would enable the government to engineer a Pareto improvement (say, by
raising G by more than implied by (3.3)). This shows that the starting point characterized
by full insurance of both skill groups cannot be a social optimum.
The intuition for this result is the following: by reducing disability insurance through
ac u ti nb, the government stimulates labor supply and thus expands the base of the la-
bor tax because agents can partly undo the worsening of disability insurance by working
harder in the ﬁrst period if sd >s a — a condition that must be met in the initial equilib-
rium with full insurance. Given an initial equilibrium with full disability insurance, the
welfare loss from reduced insurance is only second order, whereas the expansion of the
labor income tax base generates a ﬁrst-order welfare gain if t1 > 0. In other words, dis-
ability insurance should be less than perfect if the government also wants to insure against
skill heterogeneity through a positive labor income tax rate redistributing resources from
high-skilled to low-skilled agents.
The government thus faces an incentive to prevent private insurance companies from
fully insuring disability. This encourages individuals to self-insure through precautionary
individual saving and to improve their beneﬁts from public disability insurance through
additional work eﬀort when young (if sd >s a). Although we do not model moral hazard
14in disability insurance, full insurance is thus not optimal. The reason is that private
insurance against disability generates a negative ﬁscal externality on the base of the
distortionary tax oﬀering insurance against skill heterogeneity. With endogenous labor
supply and lack of public information on individual work eﬀort, this public insurance of
skill heterogeneity does generate moral hazard.4
3.3. The optimal marginal tax rates
Expressions for the optimal (eﬀective) marginal income tax rates are derived in section
A.3 of the appendix. If the high-skilled are less than fully insured against disability, the






























2 in (3.10) measures the marginal social valuation of second-period income
for an able high-skilled worker (accounting for the impact on the public budget through
the induced income eﬀect on labor supply). ε 
2 and εh
2 denote the wage elasticities of
second-period labor supply for the low-skilled and the high-skilled, respectively, so that
ε2 is a weighted elasticity of second-period labor supply. 1 − β2 measures the degree of
inequality in the distribution of second-period pre-tax labor income. The optimal value of
t depends only on variables relating to the second period. The reason is that ﬁrst-period
labor supply is determined by b t1 rather than t. By varying sd and sa, the government can
manipulate b t1 independently from t (see (2.13) and (2.14)).
The optimal eﬀective marginal tax rate on ﬁrst-period labor income (deﬁn e di n( 3 . 8 ) )
is given by an analogous expression if both skill groups are less than fully insured against
4For the external eﬀects between insurers in the presence of moral hazard, see Pauly (1974) and
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986).
5The next sub-section shows that the conditions for both skill groups to be less than fully insured
in the optimum are weak. If the non-mimicking constraint for the high-skilled would nevertheless be
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The inequality in the distribution of ﬁrst-period labor income enters through the variable
β1. During the ﬁrst period, both income and substitution eﬀects aﬀect labor supply.
Nevertheless, the optimal marginal tax rate depends only on substitution eﬀects, captured
by the weighted average (εc
1) of the compensated skill-speciﬁc labor supply elasticities, εc
1 
and εc
1h.T h ev a r i a b l eαh
1 measures the marginal social evaluation of ﬁrst-period income
for a high-skilled worker taking the tax-base eﬀect into account.
I nt h en o r m a lc a s e ,t h eg o v e r n m e n tw i s h e st or e d i s t r i b u t ei n c o m es ot h a tαh
i < 1,
i =1 ,2.7 (3.10) and (3.11) then imply that the optimal marginal tax rates are positive.
Moreover, ceteris paribus the elasticities and the marginal social evaluations, these opti-
mal tax rates increase with the degree of inequality in the distribution of pre-tax income.
Furthermore, a larger fraction of high-skilled workers in the labor force 1 − α broadens
the base for redistribution, making it worthwhile to impose a higher marginal tax rate.8
According to (3.10) and (3.11), the government typically wants to impose diﬀerent
marginal eﬀective tax rates on income in the two periods by choosing a non-zero value of
6As already mentioned, the next sub-section shows that the conditions are weak for both skill groups
to be less than fully insured in the optimum.
7Expressions (A.16) and (A.18) in the appendix imply that the marginal social evaluation averaged
over the low- and high-skilled is unity: α · α 
i +( 1− α) · αh
i =1(where α 
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8Although derived in an intertemporal context, the formulas (3.10) and (3.11) are closely related to
the formula for the optimal linear income tax obtained by Dixit and Sandmo (1977) for the case with
many skill groups in a one-period setting. In the Dixit-Sandmo world, the optimal marginal tax rate on












is the covariance between the marginal social evaluation of income for skill group i
(accounting for the impact on the public budget via the induced income eﬀect on labor supply) and the





is the income-weighted average compen-
sated labor supply elasticity across skill groups. In fact, (3.10) and (3.11) can be written in this form by
using expressions (A.16) and (A.18) in the Appendix, which imply that the marginal social evaluation
averaged over the low- and high-skilled is unity (see the previous footnote).
16the average subsidy rate e s (since t1 ≡ t − h s
1+r ,w h i l eβ1, αh
1 and εc
1 generally diﬀer from
β2, αh
2 and ε2). Ceteris paribus βi and αh
i ; i =1 ,2, if the labor supply of older workers
is more wage elastic than that of younger workers (i.e ε2 >ε 1), eﬃciency considerations
cause the optimal t to be below the optimal t1. Ceteris paribus the elasticities and the
marginal social evaluations, αh
i , distributional considerations reinforce this tendency if
ﬁrst-period labor income is more unequally distributed than second-period labor income
(i.e. β1 <β 2).
3.4. The optimal level of social insurance
The previous sub-section assumed that neither the low-skilled nor the high-skilled were
fully insured. This sub-section states the conditions under which imperfect insurance
of both skill groups is indeed optimal. Section A.4 in the appendix employs the ﬁrst-
order conditions for the solution to the optimal tax problem to derive expressions for the
marginal utility diﬀerentials U0
d  −U0
a  and U0
dh −U0
ah, assuming that no skill group faces
a binding non-mimicking constraint, i.e., that no group is fully insured. If the resulting
expressions are positive, this validates the initial assumption of imperfect insurance.
For the low-skilled group, the assumption that no group faces a binding non-mimicking



















































where Ω  and Ωh are positive magnitudes that depend on the properties of the utility
function (see eq. (A.37) in the appendix). Sub-section 3.1 demonstrated that the optimal
policy involves sd >s a. The expression on the right-hand side of (3.12) is therefore
positive if Ψ is positive. In view of the deﬁnition of Ψ, the conditions on εc
1h and εc
1  for
this to be the case are very weak, since β1 < 1 and U0
1  >U 0
1h. Accordingly, the low-skilled
are imperfectly insured against disability as long as t1 > 0. Redistributive taxation thus
makes imperfect disability insurance optimal.
For high-skilled workers, the assumption that no skill group faces a binding non-

































Inserting (3.11) into (3.13) to eliminate t1

































The conditions for the right-hand side of (3.14) to be positive are weak, since W>w ,
1−αh
1 ≤ 1, and U0
1 /λ > 1 (if ∂L1
∂G ≈ 0). In particular, the condition is met if Ω  does not
greatly exceed Ωh (implying that imperfect insurance of the low-skilled does not provide
much stronger incentives than imperfect insurance of the high-skilled) and inequality is
high so that β1 is small. Intuitively, high inequality drives up the marginal tax rate, thus
distorting labor supply. To oﬀset this distortion, the government ﬁnds it optimal to oﬀer
only imperfect disability insurance to skilled agents in order to induce these agents to
work harder in the ﬁrst period so as to obtain better disability insurance in the second
period. Indeed, equations (3.12) and (3.13) show that full disability insurance is optimal
if the government does not employ distortionary taxes to redistribute across skills (i.e. if
t1 =0because β1 =1 ,α h
1 =1 , or α =1 ) . Hence, disability insurance is imperfect to the
extent that it helps to alleviate the labor-market distortions imposed by redistributive
taxation. In the absence of these distortions, the government would structure its public
transfers so as to provide full disability insurance to both skills.
4. Concluding remarks
This paper studied optimal lifetime income taxation and social insurance in an economy
where public policy insures (from behind the ’veil of ignorance’) both skill heterogeneity
and exogenous disability risk. Although the government has at its disposal suﬃcient
policy instruments to insure both skill groups fully against disability, and even though
moral hazard in disability is absent, full disability insurance is not optimal. Instead, by
oﬀering imperfect insurance and structuring disability beneﬁts so as to enable workers to
improve their insurance against disability by working harder, the government can allevi-
ate the distortionary impact of the redistributive labor income tax. Speciﬁcally, optimal
18disability insurance should allow disability beneﬁts to vary positively with previous earn-
ings. Hence, the eﬀective marginal tax rate depends on the taxpayer’s lifetime earnings
capacity, and redistribution is based on lifetime incomes. Lifetime taxation improves the
trade-oﬀ between insurance and incentives. It provides better disability insurance for
the high-skilled and enhances their incentives to supply labor, thereby alleviating the
labor-market distortions imposed by redistributive taxation.
To allow a detailed characterization of the optimal tax and subsidy rates, we have
restricted the analysis to a linear tax-transfer system with certain non-linear elements.
We did not study the potential second-best role of capital income taxation in the overall
tax-transfer system. Since precautionary saving allows people to partly insure against
shocks to their human capital, the government may choose to distort saving. In future
work we plan to extend the analysis to a fully non-linear tax system that also allows for
capital income taxation distorting saving behavior.
19Technical Appendix
This appendix derives the eﬀects of the various policy instruments on individual labor
supply and the ﬁrst-order conditions for the solution to the optimal tax problem. We
then use these relationships to prove some results reported in the main text.
A.1. The eﬀects of taxes and transfers on labor supply
We consider the labor supply of the low-skilled group; the labor supply of high-skilled
workers is characterized by completely analogous expressions. For convenience, we drop
the subscript   in terms involving derivatives of the utility function. To ﬁnd the elasticities
of ﬁrst-period labor supply and saving with respect to the policy variables, we totally
diﬀerentiate (2.11) and (2.12) to arrive at
⎛
⎝ −a1G − (1 + r)(a1b + a1B) −a1G¯ s w − a1bsdw − a1Bsaw
−a2G − (1 + r)(a2b + a2B) −g00( 1)U
0
















S ≡− a1GdG + a1bdb + a1BdB +( a1Gw 1 − a1Bw 2)dt + a1bw 1ds
d + a1Bw 1ds
a,
∆
L ≡− a2GdG + a2bdb + a2BdB +( wU
0
1 + a2Gw 1 − a2Bw 2)dt
+(a2bw 1 − δwpU
0
d)ds






ˆ p sd +( 1− ˆ p )sa
1+r
,a 1G ≡− U
00
1,a 2G = −¯ swU
00
1,
a1b ≡− δ(1 + r)p[pU
00
d +( 1− p)U
00











a1B ≡− δ(1 + r)(1− p)[pU
00
da +( 1− p)U
00











Applying Cramer’s Rule to the system (A.1), we can ﬁnd the various labor-supply












1 − a2G¯ s w − a2bsdw − a2Bsawa 1G¯ s w + a1bsdw + a1Bsaw









where the determinant ∆ of the Jacobian is positive because of the second-order condition
for individual optimization.






























































where the last equality follows by substituting (2.11) to eliminate U0






















































21Note that with s = sa = sd (so that ﬁrst-period labor supply does not act as insur-
ance against disability), we have a2i = sw
(1+r)a1i,i= G,b,B and thus ∂ 1
∂G = ∂ 1
∂b = ∂ 1
∂B =0 .
Intuitively, saving rather than labor supply is adjusted to reallocate consumption in-
tertemporally. This is also the intuition behind (A.11): if the consumer receives addi-
tional lump-sum income in both states in the second period (i.e. db = dB > 0),s h ew i l l
r e s p o n di nt h es a m ew a ya si ft h a ti n c o m ec o m e si nt h eﬁrst period (discounted properly
with 1+r so that dG = db
1+r = dB
1+r). The consumer will simply undo reallocation of
lump-sum income dG = − db
1+r = − dB
1+r over the life cycle through saving behavior as long
as the generational account is not aﬀected.






















































































































































2  − h( 2))
(1 − p)u0 (Ca
2  − h( 2))
> 0.
Moreover, concavity of the utility function implies that U00
aU00
d −(U00
da)2 > 0. It then follows
from (A.12) that a higher transfer to the disabled (b) reduces labor supply if sd >s a.
Intuitively, labor supply helps to insure disability if sd >s a. In that case, more insurance
through a higher b makes labor supply less attractive. Similarly, a higher transfer to the
able (B) implies that disability is less well insured, and according to (A.13) labor supply
therefore increases to better insure disability (if sd >s a so that labor supply helps to
insure disability). Note that there are two terms in the expressions for d 1
db and d 1
dB. The
22term including a1G depends on intertemporal substitution (and also on risk aversion),
while the other term (including U00
aU00
d − (U00
da)2) depends only on risk aversion. With
higher b, the consumer wants to spread the welfare gain to the able state if risk aversion
is positive (this is the term with U00
aU00
d − (U00
da)2)a n dt ot h eﬁrst period (via increased
ﬁrst-period consumption of leisure as well as material goods) if intertemporal substitution
is ﬁnite. The latter eﬀect is captured by the term with a1G, which is positive only if
risk aversion is correspondingly positive; otherwise, the consumer can better reallocate
resources to the ﬁrst period through dissaving rather than by lowering ﬁrst-period labor
supply.
Ah i g h e rﬁrst-period transfer G depresses ﬁrst-period labor supply if higher income
boosts utility (especially in the disabled state (U0
d >U 0
a)) and consumption in the two
states are complements (i.e. U00
da > 0 because risk aversion exceeds the inverse of intertem-
poral substitution), and the intertemporal substitution elasticity is ﬁnite (i.e., a1G > 0). If
U00
da=0, a higher transfer may actually raise ﬁrst-period labor supply if additional second-
period income especially leads to a rapid fall in utility in ability (i.e., (−U00
a) is large
compared to (−U00
d)) so that it becomes attractive to reallocate income to the disabled
s t a t e .N o t et h a tt h es i g no ft h ei n c o m ee ﬀect on labor supply is diﬀerent from normal.
This is because labor supply has an insurance function.
A.2. The suboptimality of full insurance
We may now derive the result stated in eq. (3.9) which was used to demonstrate that
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Using the deﬁnitions in (2.2) through (2.6), we ﬁnd that
X
  = −
"
u00 (Ca
2  − h( 2))
(1 − p)u0 (Ca












Since concavity of the utility function implies U00
aU00
d − (U00





∂G − ∂ 1
∂b > 0 for sd >s a. A similar result holds for the high-skilled group,
as reported in (3.9).
A.3. The optimal labor income tax rates
The optimal tax problem is to maximize the social welfare function (2.22), subject
to the constraints (2.19), (2.20) and (2.21). Using (2.17) and (2.18) together with the
results (A.3) through (A.7), we may write the ﬁrst-order conditions for the solution to
this problem as follows (where the subscript   (h) refers to the low-skilled (high-skilled),
the superscript c indicates a compensated labor supply response, and λ, µ ,a n dµh are the
shadow prices associated with the government budget constraint and the non-mimicking
constraints for the low-skilled and the high-skilled, respectively (note that second-period
labor supply is not aﬀected by income eﬀects)):9
G: αU
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B: δ(1 − p)[αU
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1  + δw 2 (1 − p)U
0
a ]+( 1− α)[WL1U
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9(A.16), (A.17) and (A.18) are not independent equations. To see this, add (A.17) and (A.18),
multiply the result by (1 + r), and use (A.11) and (2.11) to arrive at (A.16). The government thus has
































































































[αw 1 +( 1− α)WL1]+µ







































a: δ(1 − p)[αw 1U
0










































































where t1 is deﬁn e di n( 3 . 8 ) .I na d d i t i o nt om e e t i n gt h e s eﬁrst-order conditions, the solu-
tion to the optimal tax problem must also satisfy the complementary slackness conditions:
µ
  ≥ 0,Z
  ≥ 0,µ
 Z





h =0 . (A.23)
To ﬁnd the optimal marginal tax rate on second-period labor income (t), we start
by adding the ﬁrst-order conditions (A.20) and (A.21), multiplying by 1+r,a n du s i n g
(A.11) and (2.11) (for both households) to obtain
αU
0
1 w 1 +( 1− α)U
0




























































































































∂W (1 − t)
W (1 − t)
L2
.















































Substituting (A.26) into (A.25) to eliminate U0
a , dividing through by
λWL2(1−α)(1−p)
1+r and



























2, β2 and ε2 are deﬁned in eq. (3.10) in the main text.
Next we derive the optimal eﬀective marginal tax rate on ﬁrst-period labor income

























































































Equating the right-hand sides of (A.28) and (A.29), using the facts (from the deﬁnition























∂W (1 − t1)
, (A.30)
and dividing by WL 1,w eg e t



















































∂W (1 − t1)
W (1 − t1)
L1
.
Dividing through by λ[αβ1εc
1  +( 1− α)εc





































1 are deﬁn e di n( 3 . 1 1 )i nt h em a i nt e x t . W h e nn o n eo ft h et w on o n -
mimicking constraints are binding (that is, when it is optimal to oﬀer less than full
insurance to both skill groups), we have µ  = µh =0 , and (A.27) and (A.32) then reduce
to eqs. (3.10) and (3.11) in the text, respectively.
A.4. The optimal level of social insurance
Finally, we derive the expressions for the optimal level of social insurance reported in
sub-section 3.4. To investigate the conditions under which the optimal insurance level is
less than perfect, we set µ  = µh =0 . Dividing (A.20) by p and (A.21) by 1 − p,a n d
subtracting the latter equation from the former, we obtain
δαw 1 (U
0
d  − U
0












































































,i =  ,h. (A.34)










ah) − (1 − β1)α(U
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Dividing (A.17) by δpand (A.18) by δ(1 − p) (recalling that µ  = µh =0 ) and subtracting
the latter equation from the former, we obtain
α(U
0


































































































h > 0, (A.38)
where Ωh is deﬁned analogously to Ω . Using (A.37) and (A.38), we can write (A.35) as
αβ1 (U
0


































  +( 1− α)WΩ
h¤
, (A.39)
U s i n g( A . 3 7 )a n d( A . 3 8 ) ,w ec a nw r i t e( A . 3 6 )a s
α(U
0












  +( 1− α)WΩ
h¤
. (A.40)
28Using (A.40) to eliminate (1 − α)(U0
dh − U0
ah) from (A.39), and solving for U0
d  −U0
dh,w e
arrive at eq. (3.12) in the main text. Alternatively, using (A.40) to eliminate α(U0
d  − U0
al)
from (A.39) and solving for U0
dh − U0
ah, we end up with eq. (3.13).
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